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We begin by describing recent developments in the burgeoning
discipline of applied ontology, focusing especially on the ways
ontologies are providing a means for the consistent representation
of scientific data. We then introduce Basic Formal Ontology
(BFO), a top-level ontology that is serving as domain-neutral frame-
work for the development of lower level ontologies in many spe-
cialist disciplines, above all in biology and medicine. BFO is a
bicategorial ontology, embracing both three-dimensionalist (con-
tinuant) and four-dimensionalist (occurrent) perspectives within
a single framework. We examine how BFO-conformant domain
ontologies can deal with the consistent representation of scientific
data deriving from the measurement of processes of different
types, and we outline on this basis the first steps of an approach to
the classification of such processes within the BFO framework.1
1. The Background of Applied Ontology
1.1 Applied Ontologies in Biology
In the wake of the successful sequencing of the human genome,
contemporary biology has been transformed into a discipline in
which computer processing of genomic data plays an essential
role. But genomic data processed by computers are useful to our
understanding of, say, animal behavior, or human health and
disease, only if some way can be found to link these data
to theoretical assertions using terms that are intelligible to biolo-
gists. Such links are created by means of what biologists call
‘ontologies’, which are classifications of biological and other phe-
1 With acknowledgements to all of those who have worked on the development of Basic
Formal Ontology since its inception, and with special thanks to Thomas Bittner, Werner
Ceusters, Damiano Costa, Pierre Grenon, Ingvar Johansson, Kevin Mulligan, Chris
Mungall, Alan Ruttenberg, and Peter Simons. The work on this paper was partially sup-
ported by the National Institutes of Health through the NIH Roadmap for Medical
Research, Grant 1 U 54 HG004028 (National Center for Biomedical Ontology).
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nomena used to annotate (or ‘tag’) genomic and other experi-
mental data in a systematic way that enables computers to gain
consistent access even to data that has been collected in highly
heterogeneous ways.2
When scientists are collecting data, this still frequently happens
in a poorly coordinated fashion, and this is so even where the
scientists in question are working in the same field. The data are
in consequence difficult to aggregate in ways that might be useful
in testing hypotheses or in drawing comparisons. In former times
the needed connections were drawn through manual inter-
vention by human beings familiar with the subject-matter. The
indispensability of computers to the processing of data in
information-intensive areas of science, however, has brought the
recognition that ways need to be found to establish such connec-
tions computationally. The rise of science-based ontologies3 is one
product of this recognition.4
We shall focus in what follows on those ontologies that are
being developed on the basis of the assumption that, to create an
ontology that brings benefits to scientists working with data in a
given domain, the ontology should employ classifications that are
based on the established scientific understanding of the entities
and relations in this domain.5 An ontology of this sort comprises
theoretical terms used to represent the types or classes of entities
in some given domain together with relational expressions repre-
senting the relations between these entities. It thereby extends
into the terminology of scientific theories some of the advantages
brought by the International System of Units to the consistent
representation of experimental data expressed in quantitative
terms.
Each ontology can be conceived as a set of terms (nouns and
noun phrases) which form the nodes of a directed acyclical graph,
as in Figure 1. We can think of the nodes in such a graph as
2 David P. Hill, et al., ‘Gene Ontology Annotations: What They Mean and Where They
Come From’, BMC Bioinformatics, 9 (2008), S2.
3 On May 7, 2012 a google query for ‘ontology and database’ returned some 10 million
hits, almost twice as many as are returned for the query ‘ontology and philosophy’.
4 Judith Blake, ‘Bio-ontologies – fast and furious’, Nature Biotechnology 22 (2004), 773–
774.
5 Some of the principles governing ontologies of this sort are set forth and defended in
Barry Smith and Werner Ceusters, ‘Ontological Realism as a Methodology for Coordinated
Evolution of Scientific Ontologies’, Applied Ontology, 5 (2010), 139–188.
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representing types or universals,6 which are the sorts of entities
represented by the general terms used in formulating scientific
theories such as ‘cell’ or ‘electron’ and which have instances
which are the sorts of entities that are observed in scientific
experiments. The nodes in the graph are joined by edges repre-
senting relations between the types, of which the most important
(illustrated in Figure 1) are is_a (abbreviating ‘is a subtype of’)
and part_of .7
6 We use these expressions synonymously in what follows. In the wider ontological
literature the term ‘class’ is often used for what we are here calling types or universals.
7 Barry Smith, et al., ‘Relations in Biomedical Ontologies’, Genome Biology (2005), 6 (5),
R46.
Figure 1 Fragments of the Gene Ontology from http://www.ebi.ac.uk/
QuickGO/. Nodes in the graph represent types in reality; edges repre-
sent is_a and part_of relations
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When two nodes are joined together by the is_a relation, as for
example in:
(1) receptor activity is_a molecular function
then this represents an assertion to the effect that all instances of
the first type are also instances of the second type.
When two nodes are joined together by the part_of relation,
as in
(2) viral receptor activity part_of response to virus
then this represents an assertion to the effect that every instance
of the first type is a part of some instance of the second type.
(Here ‘part of’ in the unitalicized form represents the familiar
instance-level parthood relation holding between, for example,
your finger and your hand, or between the first half of a football
match and the whole match.8)
1.2 The Common Logic Interchange Format and the Web
Ontology Language
Ontological axioms such as (1) and (2), together with accompa-
nying definitions of terms and relations, are formulated using
logical languages – typically fragments of first-order logic – devel-
oped to facilitate the representation and interchange of informa-
tion and data among disparate computer systems.9 Prominent
examples are the (CLIF) Common Logic Interchange Format10
and the (OWL) Web Ontology Language11. Common Logic is an
ISO Standard family of languages with an expressivity equivalent
to that of first-order logic. OWL-DL is a fragment of the language
of first order logic belonging to the family of what are called
Description Logics. While OWL-DL is marked by severe restric-
tions on its expressivity, the theories formulated in its terms have
8 See again ‘Relations in Biomedical Ontologies’.
9 http://metadata-stds.org/24707/index.html.
10 Common Logic – A Framework for a Family of Logic-Based Languages, ed. Harry Delugach.
ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 32N1377, International Standards Organization Final Committee
Draft, 2005-12-13; http://cl.tamu.edu/docs/cl/32N1377T-FCD24707.pdf.
11 ‘OWL 2 Web Ontology Language’, http://www.w3.org/TR/owl2-overview.
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desirable computational properties. Because logical languages
such as CLIF or OWL are used in their formulation, ontologies
themselves can be viewed as simple first-order theories. Providing
care is taken to use terms, definitions and relational expressions
in consistent ways in different ontologies, such theories can be
merged at will to create larger ontologies and, at least in the case
of ontologies formulated using a language like OWL, the consis-
tency of such mergers can be checked automatically using dedi-
cated software applications called ‘reasoners’.12
1.3 The Gene Ontology
It is the Gene Ontology (GO), portions of which are illustrated in
Figure 1, which is the most successful ontology currently being
used by scientists in reasoning with experimental data.13 The GO
consists of three sub-ontologies, together comprehending some
30,000 terms representing types and subtypes of biological processes,
molecular functions, and cellular components. The GO is used by
researchers in biology and biomedicine as a controlled vocabulary
for describing in species-neutral fashion the attributes of genes
and gene products (for example proteins) identified both in
experiments on model organisms such as mouse or fly and in
clinical studies of human beings. The GO offers a set of terms, such
as ‘membrane’ or ‘viral receptor activity’ or ‘meiosis’, which are
defined in ways which reflect the usage of biologists. It thereby
provides a means of computationally associating humanly intelli-
gible descriptions of biological phenomena with the massive quan-
tities of sequence data being made available through genomic
experimentation. Because the GO is species neutral, it provides a
means of comparing data pertaining to different organisms in a
way which allows results gained through experimentation on non-
human organisms to be exploited in studies of human health and
disease.14
12 http://www.w3.org/2007/OWL/wiki/Implementations.
13 The Gene Ontology Consortium, et al., ‘Gene Ontology: Tool for the Unification of
Biology’, Nature Genetics, 2000 May; 25(1): 25–29.
14 See for example A. Mohammadi et al., ‘Identification of Disease-Causing Genes Using
Microarray Data Mining and Gene Ontology,’ BMC Medical Genomics, 2011; 4: 12.
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1.4 The Gene Ontology and the Unification of Science
The GO is described by its originators as a ‘tool for the unification
of biology’, and we can see how it is being used, in conjunction
with other ontologies such as the Protein15 and Cell Ontologies16,
to realize at least a part of the old logical empiricist vision of a
logical unification of scientific knowledge.17 One aspect of this
realization – not clearly anticipated by the logical empiricists – is
the degree to which not only do theoretical assertions need to be
unified through use of common logically structured ontologies,
but so also do experimental data (for example gene or protein
sequence data) compiled in databases processed by computers. In
addition, bioinformaticians have discovered that additional ontol-
ogy resources are needed to unify both of these with assertions
about the experimental and computational procedures used to
generate the data. This aspect of the unification of science is
addressed by the Ontology for Biomedical Investigations (OBI),18
which comprehends a set of terms which can be used to describe
the attributes of experiments in biological and related domains.
The goal is a logically well-structured set of preferred terms and
logical definitions that can be used to support common access
to, and computational reasoning over, data about experiments in
order to address the problems which arise at the point where
experimental methods (or protocols or statistical algorithms or
sample processing techniques or software or equipment used)
have become so complex as to cause problems for the interpreta-
tion and comparison of the results achieved with their aid. The
underlying idea is that use of the OBI vocabulary to annotate
results obtained through experimentation would make these
results not only more easily interpretable by human beings but
also more reliably processable by computers.
15 Darren A. Natale, et al. ‘The Protein Ontology: A Structured Representation of
Protein Forms and Complexes’, Nucleic Acids Research, 39 (2011), D539–45.
16 Terrence F. Meehan, et al. ‘Logical Development of the Cell Ontology’, BMC Bioin-
formatics 12 (2011), 6.
17 Rudolf Carnap, ‘Logical Foundations of the Unity of Science’, International Encyclo-
paedia of Unified Science, vol. I, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1938. Compare also
J. J. Woodger, The Axiomatic Method in Biology, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1937, and the discussion in Smith and Ceusters, ‘Ontological Realism’.
18 Ryan R. Brinkman, et al., ‘Modeling Biomedical Experimental Processes with OBI’,
Journal of Biomedical Semantics, 2010, 1, Suppl. 1.
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2. Basic Formal Ontology
As will by now be clear, the principal concerns of applied ontolo-
gists are highly practical in nature. Just occasionally, however, they
still face problems of a recognizably philosophical sort, and one
such problem – relating to the treatment of process measurement
data – is the topic of this essay.
Basic Formal Ontology (BFO) is a domain-neutral resource
used by biologists and others to provide a top-level ontology that
can serve as a common starting point for the creation of domain
ontologies in different areas of science.19 BFO provides a formal-
ontological architecture and a set of very general terms and rela-
tions that are currently being used by more than 100 ontology
development groups in biology and other fields.20
BFO is, by the standards predominant in contemporary ontol-
ogy, very small, consisting of just 34 terms (see Figure 2), includ-
ing both familiar terms such as ‘process’, ‘object’, ‘function’,
‘role’ and ‘disposition’, and less familiar terms such as ‘generically
dependent continuant’ and ‘continuant fiat boundary’. Each of
these terms must either be declared primitive and elucidated by
examples and accompanying axioms, or it must be defined in a
logically coherent way in terms of these primitives.
2.1 Continuants and Occurrents
BFO takes as its starting point a familiar distinction between
two sets of views, which we can refer to as four-dimensionalist
and three-dimensionalist, respectively. Four-dimensionalists (in
simple terms) see reality as consisting exclusively of four-
dimensional entities (variously referred to as processes, events,
occurrents, perdurants, spacetime-worms, and so forth). They
thereby regard all talk of entities of other sorts – for example, of
three-dimensional things such as you and me – as a mere locution,
to be eliminated in favour of some ultimate four-dimensionalist
translation. (A four-dimensionalist might hold, for example, that
only processes exist, and that talk of continuously existing things
pertains rather to special kinds of processual entities, for example
19 http://ontology.buffalo.edu/BFO/Reference.
20 http://www.ifomis.org/bfo/users.
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to continuous series of processes of a bill-clintonizing sort.22) The
three-dimensionalists who embrace positions at the opposite
extreme see reality as consisting exclusively of entities extended
along the three spatial dimensions, and they view all change in
terms of the different attributes truly predicable of such entities
at different times. Talk of processes, from this perspective, is a
mere locution to be eliminated in favour of some ultimate three-
dimensionalist translation.
Both families of views bring benefits of their own. In the field of
medical ontology, for example, four-dimensionalism provides
a natural framework for the ontological treatment of processes
of, say, drug interaction or immune response, while three-
dimensionalism provides a similarly natural framework for the
treatment of the chemical, histological and anatomical structures
which participate in such processes.
Unfortunately, the two sets of views are standardly formulated
in a way which forces a choice between one or the other. BFO, in
contrast, is founded on a bicategorial approach which seeks to
combine elements of both the three-dimensionalist and four-
dimensionalist perspectives.23 Thus it incorporates an ontology of
continuants and an ontology of occurrents within a single frame-
work in a way that seeks to reconcile the contrasting logico-
ontological orders reigning in each.
2.2 Zemach’s ‘Four Ontologies’
BFO’s treatment of the dichotomy between continuants and
occurrents is adapted in part from the strategy proposed by
Zemach in his ‘Four Ontologies’24 for distinguishing between con-
tinuant and non-continuant entities, which Zemach calls ‘things’
and ‘events’, respectively. The former, for Zemach, are defined by
the fact that they can be sliced (in actuality, or in imagination) to
yield parts only along the spatial dimension – for example those
parts of your table which we call its legs, top, nails, and so on.25
22 W. V. O. Quine, Word and Object (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press), 1960.
23 Pierre Grenon and Barry Smith, ‘SNAP and SPAN: Towards Dynamic Spatial Ontol-
ogy’, Spatial Cognition and Computation, 4 (2004), 69–103.
24 Eddy Zemach, ‘Four Ontologies’, Journal of Philosophy 23 (1970), 231–247.
25 ‘My desk stretches from the window to the door. It has spatial parts, and can be sliced
(in space) in two. With respect to time, however, a thing is a continuant.’ (‘Four Ontolo-
gies’, p. 240)
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The latter, in contrast, can be sliced to yield parts along any spatial
and temporal dimensions. For example: the first year of the life of
your table; the entire life of your table top (as contrasted with the
life of your table legs); and so forth. As Zemach puts it:
An event is an entity that exists, in its entirety, in the area
defined by its spatiotemporal boundaries, and each part of this
area contains a part of the whole event. There are obviously
indefinitely many ways to carve the world into events, some of
which are useful and interesting (e.g., for the physicist) and
some of which – the vast majority – seem to us to create hodge-
podge collections of no interest whatsoever. (‘Four Ontolo-
gies’, pp. 233 f.)
Zemach notes that it is the ontology of continuants that comes
most naturally to normal persons:
We normally regard almost every object we come across as a
[continuant entity]: this chair, my pencil, my friend Richard
Roe, the tree around the corner, the fly that crawls on the page.
[The names we give to chairs and dogs] in our language, obey
a grammar which is fundamentally dissimilar to the grammar of
names of events. (‘Four Ontologies’, p. 240)
You, for example, are a continuant; your arms and legs are parts
of you; your childhood, however, is not a part of you; rather, it is
a part of your life. Continuants are entities which have no parts
along the time axis; that is, they may be extended along the three
spatial dimensions, not however along the temporal dimension.
It will be important for what follows that BFO generalizes Zem-
ach’s idea of a continuant entity by allowing not only things (such
as pencils and people) as continuants, but also entities that are
dependent on things, such as qualities and dispositions such as
solubility and fragility.26 The solubility of a given portion of salt
requires a dissolving process in order to be realized or manifested.
A quality, for BFO, is a dependent continuant that does not
require such a process of realization of this sort.
26 As we shall see below, processes, for BFO, are also dependent entities; they depend for
their existence on the independent continuant entities which are their participants or on
which their participants depend.
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BFO departs from Zemach also in its account of occurrent
entities. What Zemach refers to as ‘events’ are in every case the
whole content of a spatiotemporal region. As we shall see,
however, what BFO ‘processes’ are conceived in such a way that
multiple processes are able to occupy the same spatiotemporal
region, as for example when a process of your running down the
street is co-located with a process of your getting warmer.
The distinction between continuants and occurrents is for BFO
categorical. All the parts of continuants are continuants, and any
whole to which a continuant belongs is also a continuant. Simi-
larly, all the parts of occurrents are occurrents, and any whole to
which an occurrent belongs is also an occurrent. This division
flows from two essentially different ways of existing in time. For
each continuant, there is some temporal interval during which it
exists. For each occurrent there is some temporal interval during
which it occurs. Certainly there are manifold connections between
continuants and occurrents, but they are secured in BFO not
through parthood relations, but rather through relations of
participation.27
2.3 The Ontological Square
In allowing not only things but also entities that are dependent on
things as continuants, BFO draws on Aristotle’s ideas concerning
the division of substances and accidents, which reappears in BFO
as the division between independent and dependent continuants.
Given that BFO accepts also the distinction between universals
and particulars, it thus recapitulates Aristotle’s ontological
square,28 as represented in Table 1.
2.4 Determinable and Determinate Quality Universals
Qualities are first-class entities in the BFO ontology (of the sort
referred to elsewhere in the literature as ‘tropes’, or ‘individual
27 Barry Smith and Pierre Grenon, ‘The Cornucopia of Formal-Ontological Relations’,
Dialectica 58: 3 (2004), 279–296.
28 See Barry Smith, ‘Against Fantology’, in J. C. Marek and M. E. Reicher (eds.),
Experience and Analysis, Vienna: HPT&ÖBV, 2005, 153–170. Compare also E. J. Lowe, The
Four-Category Ontology. A Metaphysical Foundation for Natural Science, Oxford University Press:
Oxford 2006, and Luc Schneider, ‘Revisiting the Ontological Square’, in A. Galton and R.
Mizoguchi (eds.), Formal Ontology in Information Systems, Proceedings of the Sixth International
Conference, Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2010, 73–86.
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accidents’). They are entities which are dependent on the inde-
pendent continuant entities (such as molecules, organisms,
planets) which are their bearers. Qualities instantiate quality uni-
versals, which are divided into determinable (such as temperature,
length and mass) and determinate (such as 37.0°C temperature, 1.6
meter length, and 4 kg mass).29
Determinable quality universals are rigid in the sense that, if a
determinable quality universal is exemplified by a particular
bearer at any time during which this bearer exists, then it is
exemplified at every such time.30 John’s temperature (a certain
quality instance inhering in John from the beginning to the end
of his existence) instantiates the same determinable universal
temperature throughout John’s life, even while instantiating differ-
ent determinate temperature universals from one moment to the
next, as illustrated in Figure 3.
We note in passing that the determinate temperature universals
are independent of whatever system of units is used to describe
them. The universals here referred to in terms of degrees Celsius
would be instantiated even in a world in which the Celsius or any
other system of units had never been proposed. We note also
that for certain families of determinate qualities we can draw a
29 Ingvar Johansson, ‘Determinables are Universals,’ The Monist, 83 (2000), 101–121.
30 To say that a quality universal is exemplified by an independent continuant is to say
that some instance of this universal is dependent upon (inheres in) this independent
continuant as its bearer.
Table 1: Aristotle’s Ontological Square in BFO form
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distinction between what we can think of as absolute and relative
values, respectively. The Kelvin scale is a scale of absolute tem-
perature values in this sense.
We can acknowledge also a second sense of ‘relative’ for deter-
minate qualities that is involved for example when clinicians speak
of temperatures as falling within some ‘normal’ range. A single
person has a normal temperature in this sense only relative to (the
temperature qualities of) persons in one or other larger popula-
tion (for example healthy persons at rest in an indoor environ-
ment, persons recovering from pneumonia, persons sharing a
certain genetic mutation in common, and so on).
3. Processes in BFO
Our primary concern in the remainder of this essay is with BFO’s
treatment of occurrents, which include processes, process bound-
aries (for example beginnings and endings), spatiotemporal
regions, and temporal intervals and temporal instants. BFO uses
‘occupies’ to refer to the relation that holds between an occurrent
and the spatiotemporal region which it exactly fills. Processes and
process boundaries occupy spatiotemporal regions and they span
Figure 3 John’s temperature and some of the determinable and deter-
minate universals it instantiates at different times
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temporal intervals and temporal instants, respectively. Processes
are thus distinguished from process boundaries in that the
former, but not the latter, are temporally extended.
The assertion that one entity is an occurrent part of a second
entity means simply that both are occurrents and that the first is a
part – for example a sub-process – of the second. The sum of all
processes taking place in your upper body during the course of
your life is a proper occurrent part of the sum of processes taking
place in your whole body during the same period. There is
however a narrower relation which holds between occurrents a
and b in the case where a is exactly the restriction of b to a
temporal region that is a proper part of the temporal region
spanned by b. When this relation holds, we shall say that a and b
stand in the relation of temporal parthood, defined as follows:31
a temporal_part_of b =Def.
a occurrent_part_of b
& for some temporal region r (a spans r
& for all occurrents c, r
if (c spans r & r occurrent_part_of r)
then (c occurrent_part_of a iff c occurrent_part_of b)))
The first quarter of a game of football is a temporal part of the
whole game. The process of your heart beating from 4pm to 5pm
today is a temporal part of the entire process of your heart beating
throughout your life. The 4th year of your life is a temporal part
of your life, as is the process boundary which separates the 3rd and
4th years of your life. The process of a footballer’s heart beating
once is an occurrent part, but not a temporal part, of the whole
game (because when this heart beat occurs many other things are
occurring which are also occurrent parts of the whole game).
3.1 BFO’s Treatment of Quality Measurement Data
When BFO is used to annotate the results of measurements of
qualities, then in a typical case, for example in the case where
your height is being measured, the following elements can be
distinguished:
31 Compare Peter M. Simons, Parts. A Study in Ontology, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987,
p. 132.
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(1) the BFO:object that is you,
(2) the BFO:quality that is your height,
(3) the BFO:one-dimensional spatial region, stretching at some
time t between the top of your head and the base of your
feet, that is measured when we measure your height at t.
The result of this measurement is expressed by means of
(4) the BFO:generically dependent continuant expression:
‘1.7 m tall’.
Each item on this list is unproblematically identifiable as instan-
tiating a BFO category. (4) is an information artifact.32 It can be
stored, for instance, as a record in some file on your laptop. The
record is said to be generically dependent upon its bearer since it can
be transferred to another laptop through a process of exact
copying. The temperature of your laptop, in contrast, is specifically
dependent on the laptop, since a temperature (a specific instance
of the universal temperature) cannot migrate from one body to
another.
3.2 Ontological Treatment of Process Measurements
What happens, now, when we attempt to develop a corresponding
analysis in BFO terms of the data resulting from measurements
of processes? In the case of a body moving with constant speed,
for example, we can here distinguish at least the following
elements:
(1) the BFO:object that is moving (changing its spatial
location),
(2) the BFO:process of moving (change of spatial location),
(3) the BFO:spatiotemporal region occupied by this process
(the path of the motion),
(4) the BFO:temporal region spanned by this process (the
temporal projection of (3)),
(5) the speed of the process (rate of change of the spatial
location of (1)),
32 http://code.google.com/p/information-artifact-ontology/.
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where (5) is represented by means of
(6) the BFO:generically dependent continuant expression:
‘3.12 meters per second’.
Each of the items (1)–(4) and (6) instantiates a readily identifi-
able BFO category. For item (5), on the other hand, there is no
candidate category in the BFO ontology, since there is no coun-
terpart on the occurrent side for BFO’s qualities of independent
continuants.33
3.3 Why Processes Do Not Change
To see why not, we need to understand the reason why qualities
of independent continuants are accepted by BFO as first class
entities. This turns on the fact that independent continuants can
change from one time to the next by gaining and losing qualities.
No counterpart of such change can be accepted by BFO on the
occurrent side, since it follows trivially from BFO’s four-
dimensionalist account of occurrents that occurrents cannot
change.
Processes, in particular, cannot change on the four-
dimensionalist view, because processes are changes (they are
changes in those independent continuant entities which are their
participants).34 Certainly we have ways of speaking whose surface
grammar suggests that processes can change. But when we say, for
example, let’s speed up this process, then what we mean (in four-
dimensionalist terms) is: let’s ensure that some on-going process
is one which will be quicker than the process that would have
occurred had we not made some specific extra effort.
33 Note that we could view speed in BFO terms as a (non-rigid) quality of the moving
object, a view conformant with our way of speaking when we talk, for example, of the speed
of light, or the speed of the earth, or the speed of a billiard ball. We believe that a view
along these lines for process measurement data in general can and should be developed,
since processes of each different type can occur only if there are corresponding types of
qualities and dispositions on the side of the continuants which are their participants. Thus
we see a view of this sort as a supplement to an account along the lines presented in the
text.
34 Antony Galton and Riichiro Mizoguchi, ‘The Water Falls but the Waterfall Does Not
Fall: New Perspectives on Objects, Processes and Events’, Applied Ontology, 4 (2009),
71–107.
478 BARRY SMITH
© 2012 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
Continuants may change not only through change in qualities
but also in other ways. For example they may gain and lose parts
over time, as for example when you gain and lose cells from
your body. To address such changes, BFO’s instance-level con-
tinuant parthood relation is indexed by time. The counterpart
relation on the side of occurrents, in contrast, holds always
in a non-indexed way.35 If a process p1 occupying temporal
interval t1 is a part of a second process p2 occupying temporal
interval t2, then p1 is timelessly a part of p2 just as t1 is timelessly
a part of t2.
A second way in which continuants, but not occurrents, may
change is by instantiating non-rigid universals. We saw examples
of this in our discussion of dependent continuant universals
such as temperature above. But examples can be found also
among independent continuant universals such as larva or fetus.
If some organism a instantiates the universal larva at t, for
example, then it does not follow that a instantiates larva at all
times at which a exists. Universals on the side of occurrents, in
contrast, are always rigid, so that if an occurrent instantiates a
universal at some time, then it instantiates this universal at all
times.36
An apparent analogue of the phenomenon of non-rigidity in
the realm of occurrents is illustrated by a case such as the follow-
ing. Suppose John, half way through some 20 minute running
process p, increases his running speed from 6 to 7 mph. Could we
not then say that the process p instantiates the determinate uni-
versal 6 mph running process in the first 10 minute interval and the
determinate universal 7 mph running process in the second? On the
four-dimensionalist view, the answer to this question is ‘no’: p
never instantiates the universal 6 mph running process, any more
than the front half of my rabbit instantiates the universal rabbit.
What we can more properly assert is that p, timelessly, has a
sub-process p1 (a temporal part of p), which instantiates the uni-
versal 6 mph running process, and a subsequent sub-process p2 (a
second temporal part of p) which instantiates the universal 7 mph
running process.
35 See again Smith, et al., ‘Relations in Biomedical Ontologies’.
36 See again ‘Relations in Biomedical Ontologies’.
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3.4 First Approximation to a Solution of the Problem of Process
Measurement Data
How, then, do we respond to the need on the part of the users of
BFO to annotate data deriving from measurements which have
processes as their targets?
Our response is, in first approximation, very simple: when we
predicate, for instance, ‘has speed 3.12 m/s’, of a certain process
of motion, then we are asserting, not that that the process in
question has some special quality which the same process, in another
scenario, might conceivably have lacked. Rather, we are asserting
that this process is of a certain special type. Thus an assertion to the
effect that
(1) motion p has speed v
is analogous, not to:
(2) rabbit r has weight w,
but rather to:
(3) rabbit r instance_of universal rabbit.
(1), in other words, should be interpreted as being of the form:
(4) motion p instance_of universal motion with speed v.
where the universal motion with speed v is a specification of the
universal motion.37
This treatment of attribution in terms of instantiation reflects
what is standard policy in other parts of BFO in accordance with
its goal of remaining ontologically simple. There are no qualities
of occurrents, in BFO, just as there are no qualities of qualities,
and also no qualities of spatial or temporal regions. Leaving aside
the single case of qualities of independent continuants, attribu-
tions in BFO are quite generally treated in terms of the relation of
instantiation, as in Table 2:
37 See Ingvar Johansson, ‘Four Kinds of Is_a Relation’, in Katherine Munn and Barry
Smith (eds.), Applied Ontology, Frankfurt/Lancaster: ontos, 2008, 269–293.
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3.5 Processes as Dependent Entities
Processes themselves stand to the independent continuants which
are their participants in a relation that is analogous to that in
which qualities stand to the independent continuants which are
their bearers. In both cases we have to deal with the relation of
what BFO calls specific dependence.38 This means that we can extend
the ontological square in Table 1 with a representation of the
relation between instances and universals on the side of occur-
rents to create an ontological sextet, as in Table 3.39
Our strategy, now, is to use the instantiation relation captured
in the rightmost column of Table 3 as basis for an account of the
truthmakers of process attributions. But to make an approach
along these lines work, certain problems still need to be
addressed.
38 See again Smith and Grenon, ‘Cornucopia’.
39 See again Smith, ‘Against Fantology’.
Table 2: Examples of attributions in BFO
spatial region r has
volume w
r instance_of universal region with
volume w
height quality q has value
2 meters at t
q projects onto a one-dimensional
spatial region r at t and r
instance of universal 2 meter long
one-dimensional spatial region
temporal region t has
duration d
t instance_of universal temporal
region with duration d
temperature quality q has
value 63° Celsius
q instance_of universal 63° Celsius
temperature quality
process p has duration d process p spans temporal region t
and t instance_of universal
temporal region with duration d
motion p of object o has
trajectory with shape s
the sequence of locations occupied
by object o at successive instants
of time forms a spatiotemporal
region t and t instance_of
universal spatiotemporal region with
shape s
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4. Process Profiles
We note, first, that a single running process p might be an instance
of multiple determinable universals such as:
running process
constant speed running process
cardiovascular exercise process
air-displacement process
compression sock testing process
as well as of multiple determinate universals such as
running process of 30 minute duration
3.12 m/s motion process
9.2 calories per minute energy burning process
30.12 liters per kilometer oxygen utilizing process
and so on.
How, given the complexity of this list and of the many similar
lists which could be created for many other types of process, are
we to create classifications of the process universals instantiated
in different domains in the sort of principled way that will be
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necessary to ensure consistency and interoperability when classi-
fications are needed for the annotation of data in domains such as
physiology or pathology?
To see the lines of our answer to this question, consider Figure 4,
which illustrates the cardiac events occurring in the left ventricle of
a human heart. This figure tells us that each successive beating of
the heart is such as to involve multiple different sorts of physiologi-
cal processes, corresponding to measurements along the six dis-
tinct dimensions of aortic pressure, atrial pressure, ventricular pressure,
ventricular volume, electrical activity, and voltage40, respectively.41
40 Here voltage is used as a proxy for the intensity of sound.
41 As de Bono, et al., point out, these measurements reflect the variables encoded in
models of human physiology created by scientists using ordinary differential equations
(Bernard de Bono, Robert Hoehndorf, et al., ‘The RICORDO Approach to Semantic
Interoperability for Biomedical Data and Models: Strategy, Standards and Solutions’, BMC
Research Notes 4 (2011), 31).
42 Cardiac Cycle, Left Ventricle, http://commons.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:Wiggers_
Diagram.svg.
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These structural dimensions are, equivalently, different dimen-
sions along which processes can be compared. When comparing
two heart beating processes as being for example of the same rate,
or when comparing two games of chess as consisting of the same
series of moves, then there is something in each of the two processes
which is – not numerically but qualitatively – ‘the same’. This
something which the two processes share in common we shall
refer to in what follows to as a process profile.
What they share in common more precisely is that each con-
tains an instantiation of the same process profile universal. The
figure illustrates multiple instantiations of multiple process
profile universals reflecting the fact that we can measure and
compare cardiac processes along multiple different axes, each of
which corresponds, in our proposed terminology, to a different
determinable process profile universal.
In the running case, similarly, we can measure and compare
along different structural dimensions pertaining to speed of motion,
energy consumed, oxygen utilized, and so forth. In each case we focus
on some one structural dimension and thereby ignore, through a
process of selective abstraction, all other dimensions within the
whole process.
Not every dimension of comparison between processes corre-
sponds to a determinable process profile universal in the sense
here intended. When we compare processes as to their duration,
for example, or as to the time at which they occur or their trajec-
tory in space and time, then we can advert simply to the temporal
or spatiotemporal regions which the processes occupy (see again
Table 2 above). We can compare processes also for example in
terms of whether they involve the same participants, or take place
in the same spatial regions. Process profiles enter into the picture
only where it is something (thus some occurrent entity) in the
processes themselves that serves as fundamentum comparationis.
4.1 Quality Process Profiles
The simplest example of a process profile is that part of a process
which serves as the target of selective abstraction focused on a
sequence of instances of determinate qualities such as tempera-
ture or height. When we measure, for example, the process of
temperature increase in patient John, then there is a sequence of
determinate temperature qualities whose values when measured
on some scale are recorded on John’s temperature chart. Process
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profiles of this simple sort can very often be represented by means
of a graph in which measures of a certain quality are plotted
against time.
4.2 Rate Process Profiles
On a somewhat higher level of complexity are what we shall call
rate process profiles, which are the targets of selective abstraction
focused not on determinate quality magnitudes plotted over suc-
cessive instants of time, but rather on certain ratios between these
magnitudes and associated intervals of elapsed time. A speed
process profile, for example, is represented by a graph plotting
against time the ratio of distance covered per unit of time. Since
rates may change, and since such changes, too, may have rates of
change, we have to deal here with a hierarchy of process profile
universals at successive levels, including:
speed profile
constant speed profile
2 mph constant speed profile
3 mph constant speed profile
acceleration profile (increasing speed profile)
constant acceleration profile
32 ft/s2 acceleration profile




The types and subtypes listed here are in some respects analo-
gous to the determinable and determinable types and subtypes of
qualities recognized by BFO-conformant ontologies on the con-
tinuant side discussed already in our discussion of Figure 3 above.
And here, too, the reader must bear in mind that the determinate
process profile universals in question – while they need to be
referred to in reporting results of measurement acts using specific
units of measure – are in and of themselves unit-specification
independent.
Measurement data representing rates are often expressed in
terms not of the process profile instantiated across a temporal
interval, but rather of what holds at some specific temporal
instant. The latter is then defined in terms of the former in the
following way:
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(1) John is moving with speed v at time instant t
asserts, roughly, that there is some temporal interval (t1, t2),
including t in its interior, in which the speed v process profile
universal is instantiated. More precisely (in order to take account
of the fact that John may be moving with a continuously changing
speed in the neighborhood of t), (1) must be formulated in
something like the following terms:
(2) Given any e, however small, we can find some interval (t1,
t2), including t in its interior, during which the speed w at
which John is moving is such that the difference between w
and v is less than e.43
4.3 Cyclical Process Profiles
One important sub-family of rate process profiles is illustrated by
cyclical processes, for example the 60 beats per minute beating
process of John’s heart, or the 120 beats per minute of his drum-
ming process, and so on.
Cyclical process profiles are a subtype of rate process profiles in
which the salient ratio is not distance covered but rather number of
cycles per unit of time. Here again we find a variety of more specia-
lized universals at lower levels of generality, including for example:
rate process profile
cyclical process profile
regular cyclical process profile
3 bpm cyclical process profile
4 bpm cyclical process profile
irregular cyclical process profile
increasing cyclical process profile
and so on.
In the case of a regular cyclical process profile, a rate can be
assigned in the simplest possible fashion by dividing the number of
cycles by the duration of the temporal region occupied by the
process profile as a whole. Irregular cyclical process profiles, for
example as identified in the clinic, or in a morse code transmission,
43 e, v and w are assumed to be measured in some common unit of velocity.
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or in readings on an aircraft instrument panel, may be of specific
interest because they are of diagnostic or forensic significance.
5. Conclusion: Towards an Ontology of Time Series Graphs
We have dealt in the foregoing with only a small selection of the
ways in which processes can be classified through division into
types and subtypes. One important next step will deal with the
ways in which such classification is complicated by the fact that
processes are embedded within a series of larger process wholes,
each nested within yet larger process wholes. Thus when a billiard
ball is moving across a table, we can focus on the ball’s motion
relative to the table, but we can also focus on the larger process
which is the motion of the body-table system relative to the motion
of the earth; or we can focus on the motion of the body-table-earth
system relative to the movement of the sun; and so forth.
Human physiological processes, too, are embedded within series
of larger wholes in this way. When studying the heart, for example,
physiologists may investigate processes within the interior of the
left ventricle, interactions between the left ventricle and other parts
of the cardiovascular system, interactions between this system and
other bodily systems, and so on. Physiologists may be interested in
the processes involving multiple organisms; for example they may
be interested in some given organism as part of one or other larger
whole which includes some population of organisms of a relevant
similar type (all humans, all human babies of a given birth weight,
all athletes, and so on). Normal processes are defined for this larger
population (as normal qualities were defined above), and deviations
from this norm are defined for the single organism relative thereto.
A further application of the theory of process profiles will
include the development of an ontology of time series graphs in
terms of a view of process profiles as the truthmakers for such
graphs. On this basis we will then explore how the ontology of
process profiles might throw light on the semantics of differential
equations and of the various mathematical models of dynamic
systems in physics, biology and other disciplines constructed on
their basis.44
44 Exploratory work along these lines is described in Daniel L. Cook, et al. ‘Physical
Properties of Biological Entities: An Introduction to the Ontology of Physics for Biology,’
PLoS ONE, 2011, 6(12): e28708.
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We will investigate also how the theory can be applied not
merely to quantitative information artifacts but also to other sorts
of symbolic representations of processes, as for instance when a
chess game is represented in one or other of the standard chess
notations, or when a symphony performance is represented in a
score. Interestingly, this score itself serves also to provide the set of
instructions for the unfolding performance, and we shall explore
also ways in which the idea of process profiles may help to throw
light on how such planned processes depend on, and are at the
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